Martedì 7 Settembre 2004

La strategia di Bush in Iraq: analisi di un fallimento

Ho ripescato un lungo articolo di Peter W. Galbraith sulla transizione in corso in Iraq, apparso a fine agosto su The New York Review of Books, che a mio avviso è molto interessante e magari è sfuggito a qualcuno, complice anche il periodo di vacanze.

L'articolo contiene un dettagliato ritratto di Iyad Allawi, il leader del governo provvisorio iracheno. La conclusione è, diciamo, dubitativa:

The main problem for Allawi is that he lacks both the political constituency and the material resources to translate his tough line into effective action. According to an April public opinion survey commissioned by the US government, Allawi is one of Iraq's least popular politicians, and is strongly opposed by some 61 percent of the population (a finding that seems to have carried no weight with the Bush administration, which both commissioned the poll and chose Allawi). The Iraqi forces available to implement his tough line are neither capable nor loyal, while the use of American troops further undermines his government's narrow base of support.

Galbraith passa poi ad analizzare il pasticcio legale combinato con la costituzione provvisoria - Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Un altro grossolano errore combinato da Bremer, ossia dalla Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Scrive Galbraith, a proposito di quest'ultima:

How did the Bush administration invest so much in the TAL and then find itself forced to abandon it? It appears that Bremer never realized that his decrees would not legally outlast the occupation. It was a rookie's mistake caused, as with so many other CPA failures, by the lack of expertise on the part of his staff. The TAL was largely the responsibility of two of Bremer's assistants (dubbed "the west wingers"), one an extremely capable but relatively junior Foreign Service officer and the other a young political appointee from the Pentagon's stable of neoconservative nation-builders. Imbued with grand ideas such as remaking the Iraqi judiciary with a US-style Supreme Court, they apparently neglected to consult an international lawyer.

E, a proposito della CPA, vi segnalo questo paragrafo:

The Bush administration's recruitment of staff for the CPA is one of the great scandals of the American occupation, although it has so far received little attention from the press. Republican political connections counted for far more than professional competence, relevant international experience, or knowledge of Iraq. In May, The Washington Post ran an account of three young people recruited for service in the CPA by e-mail, without interviews, security clearances, or relevant experience. They ended up responsible for spending Iraq's budget; because they knew little about the country or about financial procedures, they did so slowly. The failure to spend money was of course the source of enormous frustration to jobless Iraqis and undoubtedly produced recruits for the insurgency. According to the Post, the threesome, who included the daughter of a prominent conservative activist, had never applied to go to Iraq and could not figure out how they were selected. Finally they realized that the one thing they had in common was that they had applied for jobs at the conservative Heritage Foundation, which had kept their resumes on file.

Si parla proprio della figlia di Ledeen, di cui ci siamo occupati in passato, che secondo altri è finita in Iraq perchè era giovane e preparata e non perchè, ripeto le parole di Galbraith, "Republican political connections counted for far more than professional competence, relevant international experience, or knowledge of Iraq".

Galbraith continua facendo un parallelo con la Bosnia: The outcome in Bosnia—where no American has died in hostile action in the nine years since the Dayton Peace Accords went into effect—could not be more different from that in Iraq. Professionalism is at least part of the reason e analizzando in grande dettaglio la nuova strategia realista di Bush e le sue possibili conseguenze. La conclusione è una non-conclusione, il fallimento della strategia americana è tale che non è possibile uscir fuori da questo casino in nessuna maniera:

The United States faces a near-impossible dilemma in Iraq. If it withdraws prematurely, it risks leaving behind a weak government unable to cope with the chaos that is the breeding ground of terrorism. By staying in Iraq, the United States undermines the legitimacy of the Iraqi government it wants to support, while US military action produces more recruits for its enemies. The advantage of a strategy aimed at loose federation is that it can create powerful regions and thereby a possible escape from our dilemma. The current strategy, if it can be called that, offers no way out

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Commenti su: La strategia di Bush in Iraq: analisi di un fallimento

Insomma, un fantoccio manovrato male da un burattinaio incompetente e non autorizzato.

L'opinione di Galbraith è citata anche in questo articolo del Christian science monitor che fà una rassegna di varie analisi elaborate recentemente sulle prosettive irachene. Quelle più tenere sottolineano con ottismo un'episodio che non riguarda gli Usa bensì la capacità di al Sistani di intervenire sulla crisi di Najaf.

Tra le più nere spicca il report del Royal Institute of International Affairs, vicino alla regina e al governo, che delinea come scenario più plausibile (se la situazione non si sblocca) caos, mattanze e guerra civile con surplus di esplosione dell'intero medio oriente.

Ne parlo dalle mie parti (link)

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